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ABSTRACT 
This research considers the impact of social engineering security attacks which are noted as taking opportunities for critically 
exploiting user awareness and behavior. The research proposes in this respect a ‘managerial’ method in an attempt to enhance 
or even ensure protection. The aim of this study is to construct a security lifecycle model against these eventualities and to 
analyze the test results that have been carried out within the context of the Turkish public sector. The main objective of the 
study is to determine why employees shared sensitive information by stating fallacies and related amendments through 
interviews and thus to understand user actions when they are face to face with a real social engineering attack. The research 
findings demonstrate that employees in Turkish public organizations are not sufficiently aware of information security and 
they generally ignore critically important security procedures. This represents an important illustration of the increasing need 
for further generalized user awareness and responsibilities where individuals and not simply software form a critical element 
of the security protection portfolio. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social engineering can be described as the technique of acquiring information that should not be disclosed or shared under 
normal circumstances through taking advantage of and using methods of influencing and convincing individuals (Mataracioglu 
2010, Mataracioglu and Ozkan 2010). All employees are responsible for information security in particular the owner of the 
information and IT personnel. However, due to its low cost and ability to take advantage of simple technology, social 
engineering is frequently reported in the literature as a very effective form of attack (Winkler and Dealy 1995). About seventy 
percent of information theft is carried out from within the organization, either consciously or unconsciously (American Society 
of Industrial Security 1996, Katz 1995, Jagatic et al. 2007). In order to understand the level and extent of information security 
’weaknesses’ it is therefore useful to analyze user behavior.  
  
Within the USA, according to The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), companies lose nearly one hundred billion dollars 
per annum because of industrial espionage (Winkler 1996). The graph in Figure 1 shows a distribution, classified by breach 
type, of computer-related incidents that have occurred in the USA between 2002 and 2011 (DataLossDB 2012). Notably, 
hacking has a rate of 22%, stolen laptop with 14%, fraud with 12%, and the web with 10%. Social engineering attacks are 
usually performed by making phone calls or using some hardware/software tools. Evidently, if we classify the attacks made 
using social engineering techniques under the titles of hacking and fraud, those incidents make up a portion of crimes at a rate 
of 34% in the USA. According to the statistics on social engineering attacks performed in the USA during 2010, 15 companies 
have been contacted and a total of 135 conversations have been made (Hadnagy et al. 2010). Approximately 93% of the 
companies’ information has been seized and most importantly only 8% of the employees actually resisted sharing their 
sensitive information during the phone calls.  
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Most people believe they have a low chance of being deceived and being aware of this shared belief the attacker disguise their 
intent to arouses no suspicion and consequently exploit the victim’s trust (Bican 2008, Microsoft 2010, Huber et al. 2009, 
Nohlberg 2008). The research in this paper provides examples of these breaches and proposes, as noted, a managerial lifecycle 
model in an attempt, at the very least, to reduce the impact of such attacks on sensitive information disclosure. 
 
Social engineers considered to exist under the white hats society, welcome the information that is seemingly harmless for an 
organization; as it may play a crucial role in convincing others they are real (Mataracioglu 2009, Mitnick and Simon 2002, 
Arslantas 2004, Hasan et al. 2010). The secret of success for social engineering is that users are very much prone to being 
deceived if you gain their trust and if they are manipulated in a certain manner (Slatalla and Quittner 1995, Voyager 1994). 
 
Social engineers frequently follow a certain route where the intention can be just the opposite in some cases. This is called 
reverse tricking (Mitnick and Simon 2002). Essentially, the attacker creates a problem where the user will be directly affected; 
then contact is made by telephone leaving a number for the user to call back. This so called ‘penetration’ is a technique where 
an outsider disguises as a member of organization staff to obtain passwords, etc.  
 
Figure 2 shows the process of social engineering attacks where the first stage is research. Here, as much information about the 
person or organization to be attacked as possible is gathered. Second is the stage of building friendship and trust. Using the 
information obtained during the previous stage, the social engineer tries to gain the sympathy of the user to use this secure 
channel by exploiting trust to obtain sensitive information. If this information is adequate, the attack may cease. If not, the 
attacker goes back to the research stage and performs the cycle again. 
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User awareness training involving the importance of procedures and their applications, computer login and password security, 
hardware and software changes in the computer, laptop usage, file access and sharing, use of printers, use of portable media, 
virus protection, Internet security, e-mail security, back-up policy, computer security event notification, and social engineering 
should be given to all organization personnel in certain periods as the primary protection method (Carnegie Mellon 
University’s Computer Emergency Response Team 2008, Rabinovitch 2007, Workman 2007, Workman 2008). As part of the 
“Continued Awareness Program”, controls such as posting caricatures and hints, posting photos of the security personnel of the 
month, posting announcements on bulletin boards, posting various information security posters, sending memo emails, 
following security-related information on internet sites, distributing brochures and using security-related screensavers and 
background pictures should be included in the intranet of the organization for information security (Laribee et al. 2006, 
Bakhshi et al. 2009, Ceraolo 1996, Qin and Burgoon 2007).  
 
The most frequently used methods of social engineering are to disguise as an organization employee, an employee of a 
company working in collaboration with the organization, an officer, a newly-recruited person or even a system producer at 
work to have a system patch installed (Gonzalez et al. 2006, Twitchell 2006, Major 2009). Other technical techniques include 
sending harmful software via email or using intra-organization terminology (Workman 2007, Workman 2008).  
 
Our investigate implements, for clarity, some of the scenarios which have been used in social engineering attacks in public 
organizations for more than three years (Peltier 2006, Abawajy 2012, Jansson and Von Solms 2011, Manske 2006).  
 
METHOD 
We formulated six different scenarios of security attacks which resulted in an approximate success rate of 70% as illustrated in 
Table 1. Consequently, we constructed a security lifecycle model against social engineering attacks to enable an analysis of the 
proposed tests that were carried out in several Turkish public sector organizations. The main contribution of the paper is the 
determination of and the reasons for sharing sensitive information by employees in the scenarios. The research aim was to 
demonstrate that information security awareness of employees is generally unacceptable. In this respect the proposed model 
provides valuable insights into ways of reducing compromised information security procedures. 
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No Formulated Scenarios 
1 
The data used in this scenario is obtained from outside the organization (Facebook, Google, MSN etc.). After 
the attacker gathers organization-related telephone information from the internet a telephone call is made 
suggesting that the caller is newly recruited at the IT department and a user name and password is required to 
update the active directory. 
2 
The data used in this scenario (telephone lists from the IT department, list of critical personnel etc.) is obtained 
from within the organization. The attacker calls these numbers again suggesting the caller is newly recruited in 
the IT department and is required to have a user name and password to update the active directory. 
3 
The attacker takes the role of an auditor and is currently in a meeting together with the CEO of the organization. 
A request is again made for a user name and password to enable an investigation as per the request of the CEO. 
4 
The data used in this scenario is obtained from outside the organization (e.g., Google). The attacker calls the 
telephone operator of the organization and wants to speak with someone from the accounting department. The 
purpose is first to obtain a name and an extension. After obtaining this information a call is made to the person 
in question and again attempts to elicit a user name and password. 
5 
If any critical software in the organization is under the operation of an external organization the attacker may 
suggest the role of an employee of that organization and again attempt to elicit the user name and the password 
for an update. 
6 
An email containing harmful software as attachment and having desirable content for users is prepared with the 
help of technical experts and is sent to users. 
Example 1: Please click on the attached document to see the latest salary increase table 
Example 2: I am a technical support group staff at the company “x”. Please kindly install the attached patch 
on your computer for the removal of a critical gap in our company’s “y” software. 
 
Table 1. Scenarios used in our social engineering attacks 
 
 
Our proposed method, as a qualitative approach, against social engineering attacks is illustrated in Figure 3. We refer to the 
model as ‘Security Lifecycle Model against Social Engineering Attacks’ (SLM-SEA). The method follows the process of: first, 
all the organization employees receive information security awareness training after which they should be able to answer the 
test questions about information security awareness. The employees who have failed the test by having a score less than a 
certain threshold, predetermined by the organization, are sent to information security awareness training again within a short 
period of time. Secondly, ten sample employees, who are not previous participants, are selected for further social engineering 
tests. 
 
Following the tests, the social engineer interviews the employees who have shared their sensitive information, in order to 
clarify user behavior. Finally, the social engineer analyzes the results and compares them with the previous results. If the 
percentage of the employees with acquired passwords is found to be above a predetermined threshold level, then the process 
will be repeated by the social engineer.  
 
This security lifecycle fits the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle which is applied in ISMS’s in constructing all ISMS 
processes (International Organization for Standardization 2005). Further, PDCA cycle may work in every management system. 
In our proposed method, test phase corresponds to “plan” and “do” phases, measure phase corresponds to “check phase”, and 
feedback and train phases correspond to “act” phase in PDCA. SLM-SEA improves users’ information security awareness due 
to the nature of lifecycles through each iteration. Since this proposed method did not take place in technical specifications 
document where the phases of information security tests were written, we could not use our proposed method in the 
organizations that we made social engineering tests. Instead we used a subset of SLM-SEA shown in Figure 4. Compared to 
SLM-SEA, Plan, Do, and Check phases remain the same. However Act phase containing feedbacks and the training phases are 
missing in the implemented method. This works in that order: first, samples of ten employees are selected within the context of 
social engineering tests and the social engineer calls the samples in order to obtain their sensitive information. After those tests, 
social engineer interviews the employees whose sensitive information has been gathered so as to determine the user behavior. 
Finally, the social engineer evaluates the results.  
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Figure 5 shows the methods used at the research phase of the social engineering cycle. Web sites of the organizations were 
evaluated to elicit information about the organization staff, instructions and procedures. Information regarding organizations 
offering assistance to those organizations, if any, was also gathered. Within this process, organization-specific documents such 
as policies, procedures, instructions, and forms; information about organizational staff names, e-mail addresses, and telephone 
numbers, and information offering support to the organization are also elicited from the Internet. All this information was 
brought together and organization staff were called in an attempt to gather sensitive information (login passwords for 
computers used by organization staff or software/application passwords). The social engineer actually holds security-related 
certificates such as Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA), Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH), and ISO 27001 Lead 
Auditor. Consequently, a member of the research team has experience and the technical ability for acquiring sensitive 
information from users. The social engineer is introduced, as one of the planned scenarios, as a new employee in the IT 
department. After the test was finished, the IT personnel were informed to ask users whose sensitive information was acquired 
during the test to change their passwords. 
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In the selection of sample employees in the social engineering tests, the three criteria below were considered: 
1. Sample employees were selected from critical departments (human resources, finance and accounting, sales and 
marketing and law.) and unit managers. 
2. After the testing of a sample was finished, another sample was selected out of the previous sample’s room so as not to 
keep track of the tests. 
3. In every tested organization, the number of female and male sample employees was equal. 
Below are the general steps followed in the simulated attacks performed in the public organizations: 
1. The social engineer gathers information about the organization, as shown in Figure 5.  
2. By using the criteria explained above, he then selects the sample employees to be called. 
3. Information from the sample employees is captured during phone calls. 
4. After the test is over, IT personnel are asked to inform the sample employees and ask them to change their passwords. 
5. The social engineer interviews the sample employees who shared their sensitive information. 
6. Finally, the social engineer analyzes the results and calculates the percentage of employees with acquired passwords 
and shares this information with the IT manager.  
7. Further, informs the IT manager about methods of lowering this percentage in the organization. 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
As part of the research TUBITAK BILGEM Cyber Security Institute has made social engineering attacks on six public 
organizations. As noted, they were Turkey’s leading organizations in monetary and finance, health, telecommunications, and 
applied sciences. It can be reported that, as part of these tests, telephone conversations were made with 56 users and 38 
passwords (corresponds to approximately 68% of users) were seized.  
 
Table 2 contains information about tested public organizations. The organizations have been classified by their core 
businesses, whether ISMS has been established, employee numbers, employee types related to core businesses, and whether 
organizations have branch offices. As shown four different types of core business as monetary and finance, applied sciences, 
health, and telecommunications. Further, none of the organizations has established ISMS neither in the whole organization nor 
in any department of the organization. Employee numbers are approximate and differ from 100 to 800. Occupations related to 
core businesses of the organizations are accountants, scientists, doctors, network engineers/technicians, contractors, and 
recording officers. In addition, only two of the organizations related to health and monetary and finance have branch offices.   
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Name Core Business ISMS Employee# 
Core Type of 
Employees 
Branch 
Office 
Organization A Monetary and 
finance 
No ~200 Accountants Yes 
Organization B Applied sciences No ~400 Scientists Yes 
Organization C Health No ~150 Doctors No 
Organization D Telecommunications No ~800 Network 
engineers/technicians 
Yes 
Organization E Monetary and 
finance 
No* ~100 Tenderees No 
Organization F Monetary and 
finance 
No* ~300 Recording officers Yes 
*  ISMS has not been established when the tests were performed, but the organization obtained the ISO 27001 
certificate afterwards. 
 
Table 2. Tested organizations 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the social engineering test results of organizations. The success rate (number of password-obtained 
participants/total number of participants) was 80% for Organization A, this rate was 50% for Organizations B and E, 60% in 
Organization C, 75% in Organization D and 100% in Organization F, which are seriously high. In fact, it may not be quite 
correct to consider success rate by organization; as it may not be possible to reach this information with this sensitive 
information, even if only one person’s information is obtained from the organization as the attacker. When the results are 
analyzed, it is apparent that employees are not that aware of information security procedures (Mataracioglu and Ozkan 2010, 
Mataracioglu 2010). We run a one way ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance) so as to see if the number of passwords seized 
varied by organizations, and concluded that ANOVA results did not vary from one organization to another. 
 
Table 3 notes that some sentences captured during the interviews with sample employees, especially unit managers performed 
after the tests and their fallacies and amendments, have been introduced and discussed. A common mistake is that most of the 
users believe they are actually telling the truth by saying fallacies, and corrections related to those fallacies by saying 
amendments. After the interviews and analyses, there exist nine fallacies in the public organizations tested in Turkey and those 
nine are common issues and found in all tested organizations.  
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Following the data analysis we conclude our conjecture is that most of the users in organizations believe in they are aware of 
information security. When analyzing the social engineering results in Figure 6, we see that the performance of the 
organizations suffers; so we also conclude that the users in public organizations are not aware of information security. 
Secondly, there exists no difference between female users and male users when gathering sensitive information such as user 
names and passwords. As seen in Table 3, the related amendment in the first line says that only 17 female sample employees 
have given their sensitive information (nearly 30% of total sample employees). 21 male sample employees (nearly 70% of total 
sample employees) have shared their sensitive information; so we proved our hypothesis. Thirdly, all of the social engineering 
attacks may not come from outside of the organization; hence organizations should be precautious about the attackers from 
inside. We conducted our social engineering tests both in and out of the organization and concluded that the percentages of 
gathering sensitive information inside and outside of the organizations are approximately the same. In addition, no matter what 
the classification of the organization is; e.g. health, telecommunications, monetary and finance, applied sciences, user 
immunity against social engineering attacks does not differ if the organization has not established ISMS. Finally, comparing 
Figure 6 and Table 2, none of the organizations has established ISMS and the lowest success rate concerning number of 
participants whose passwords were seized is above 50% which is very high. 
 
No Fallacy Captured From Related Amendment 
1 
“Female employees may share their 
sensitive information easier than 
male employees”. 
The organization related 
to monetary and finance 
The results show that only 17 female sample 
employees have given their sensitive information 
(nearly 30% of total sample employees). 21 male 
sample employees (nearly 70% of total sample 
employees) have shared their sensitive information. 
2 
“The social engineer has called the 
employees by using the inhouse 
phones and we shared the sensitive 
information. If the call was external 
we would not have shared our 
sensitive information”. 
The organization related 
to monetary and finance 
Sensitive information should be hidden from other 
employees in the organization as well as outside 
world. The research results show that most of the 
successful attacks come from inside. 
 
3 
“The social engineer is has 
introduced as a new employee in the 
organization, and we did not want to 
discourage him”. 
 
The organization related 
to health 
Not giving the sensitive information to new 
employees is not a discouraging behavior, instead, 
this should be one of the clauses of the 
organization’s information security policies and 
procedures. 
4 
During phone calls, some users 
asked the social engineer whether 
sensitive information would cause a 
problem.  
The organization related 
to health 
A social engineer never confesses that the release of 
sensitive information will cause a problem. 
 
5 
Some users were asked for IT help 
from the social engineer before 
sharing sensitive information. 
The organization related 
to telecommunications 
Sensitive information should not be shared to 
anyone for sake of any help or compensation. 
 
6 
“The social engineer was talking too 
technical during the phone call; I 
could not understand anything, 
however I shared my sensitive 
information”. 
The organization related 
to telecommunications 
The social engineer could obtain much more 
technical information about the organization by 
using different methods stated in Part 2. 
 
7 
“The voice of the social engineer 
seemed to be trustworthy and I 
believed that sharing my sensitive 
information would not cause a 
problem”. 
The organization related 
to telecommunications 
The most powerful weapon of social engineers is 
phone calls as they influence users most effectively 
 
8 
“I had a task to be completed as 
soon as possible and I shared my 
sensitive information with the social 
engineer so as to job him off”. 
The organization related 
to telecommunications 
No matter what excuse is forthcoming the sensitive 
information should not be shared with others. 
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No Fallacy Captured From Related Amendment 
9 
“The social engineer was introduced 
as an employee appointed under 
Mr./Mrs. X, the IT manager. Since 
the name of the IT manager is 
known, I trusted him working in our 
organization and shared my 
sensitive information”. 
The organization related 
to applied sciences 
Knowing some employee names does not guarantee 
that person works for the organization. Besides, 
even that person works for the organization, the 
sensitive information should not be shared with 
anyone. 
 
 
Table 3. Fallacies and related amendments formed during post-social engineering test interviews 
 
DISCUSSION 
Clearly, a limitation of our proposed method did not take place in technical specifications document where the phases of 
information security tests were written and so we could not use our proposed method in the organizations that we made social 
engineering tests. It is suggested that our proposed method named SLM-SEA given in Figure 3 should be entirely implemented 
in organizations so as to reduce the effects of social engineering attacks dramatically.   
 
Further we only conducted our social engineering attacks in Turkish public organizations. So there is a critical need to 
generalize our process to other organizations including the private sector, and non-governmental organizations globally. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The principal contribution of the paper is to determine the reasons for sharing sensitive information by stating fallacies and 
related amendments through interviews with employees so as to understand user behavior when a social engineering attack is 
carried out and to construct an information security lifecycle model against such attacks (SLM-SEA). We have found nine 
fallacies and stated related amendments in Table 3. The aim of the research was to establish that Turkish public organization 
employees lack in information security awareness and they compromise the information security principles which should be 
obligatory in any organization. We conclude that legislation for urging to establish ISMS, even to obtain ISO 27001 certificate 
in Turkish public organizations will help to turn SLM-SEA as a security lifecycle so as to immunize organizations’ employees 
against social engineering attacks.      
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